Each eye movement we make brings new information into our visual system. The selection of each fixation is the result of a complex interplay of image features, current task goals, and biases in motor control and perception. To what extent are we aware of the selection of eye movements and their visual consequences? Here we use a converging methods approach to answer this question in three diverse experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were directed to find a target in a complex scene by a verbal description of it. We then presented the path the eyes took to find the target together with those of another participant. Participants could only identify their own path when the comparison scanpath was searching for a different target. In Experiment 2, participants viewed a scene for three seconds and then named some objects from the scene. When asked whether they had looked directly at a given object, participants' responses were primarily determined by whether or not the object had been named, and not by whether it had been fixated. In Experiment 3, participants executed eye movements towards single targets, and then viewed an animated replay of either the eye movement they just executed, or that of someone else. Participants were at chance to identify their own eye movement, even when it contained large under-and overshoot corrections. The consistent inability to report on oneâĂŹs own eye movements across experiments suggests awareness of eye movements is extremely impoverished or altogether absent. This is surprising given that information about prior eye movements is clearly used during visual search, motor error correction, and learning.
Each eye movement we make brings new information into our visual system. The selection of each fixation is the result of a complex interplay of image features, current task goals, and biases in motor control and perception. To what extent are we aware of the selection of eye movements and their visual consequences? Here we use a converging methods approach to answer this question in three diverse experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were directed to find a target in a complex scene by a verbal description of it. We then presented the path the eyes took to find the target together with those of another participant. Participants could only identify their own path when the comparison scanpath was searching for a different target. In Experiment 2, participants viewed a scene for three seconds and then named some objects from the scene. When asked whether they had looked directly at a given object, participants' responses were primarily determined by whether or not the object had been named, and not by whether it had been fixated. In Experiment 3, participants executed eye movements towards single targets, and then viewed an animated replay of either the eye movement they just executed, or that of someone else. Participants were at chance to identify their own eye movement, even when it contained large under-and overshoot corrections. The consistent inability to report on oneâĂŹs own eye movements across experiments suggests awareness of eye movements is extremely impoverished or altogether absent. This is surprising given that information about prior eye movements is clearly used during visual search, motor error correction, and learning. recall their fixations, similar to the approach used by Foulsham and Kingstone (2013) and 136 Marti et al. (2015) . However, we also manipulate the availability of alternative strategies 137 for elevating accuracy above chance, namely using inferences about task or search goal (Ex-138 periment 1) or memory for objects in a scene (Experiment 2). We find that in the absence 139 of these strategies, accuracy to recognise or report on one's own fixations is minimal and 140 does not differ from chance. In Experiment 3, participants made simple saccades to single 141 targets and had to state whether the animation of the eye movement following the trial was 142 their own or someone else's. We perturbed the target position on a proportion of trials to 143 induce corrective saccades. This allowed us to determine whether or not participants were 144 able to recognise their own saccades when they contained corrections, or to correctly reject 145 saccades that contained corrections when their own saccades were accurate. Participants 146 had a bias to think accurate saccades were their own, and were otherwise at chance at this 147 task. The results from these three diverse experiments converge on the same conclusion: 148 people are generally not directly aware of their own eye movements, but they have many 149 strategies at their disposal that they can use to elevate their accuracy to report on their 150 eye movements above chance.
151

General Methods
152
Set-up
153
All experiments conducted within this study were undertaken in the Eye Movements 
Analysis
173
We have chosen to follow recent advice from Cumming (2013) on the reporting of 174 results in psychology research. Namely, we will avoid using p-values and null-hypothesis significance testing wherever possible. We expect to find a range of abilities for different 176 observers, and our aim is to measure, report, and interpret that range under different tasks 177 and conditions. Where appropriate, we use general linear mixed-effect models (from the 178 lme4 package for R) to estimate effect sizes and standard errors while factoring our random 179 effects associated with differences between individual observers and images. 95% confidence 180 intervals will be obtained by bootstrapping using the confint function. The data from these 181 experiments has been made publicly available 1 .
182
Experiment 1: Visual Search
183
In our first experiment, we were interested in discovering whether participants are 184 able to recognize their own scanpath relative to someone else's viewing the same image.
185
We followed the methods of Foulsham and Kingstone (2013), who observed 186 accuracy at this task that was only just above chance (55%). This result suggests 187 participants are able to do this successfully for a few images or scanpaths, but 188 are at chance for the majority of trials. On the one hand, it is possible that participants 189 are using a memory for which objects were fixated to do the fixation recognition task,
190
as the authors suggest. However, an alternative route through which participants could 191 achieve above-baseline accuracy in the scanpath recognition task is to infer a particular . Example stimulus with scan-paths overlaid. The four referring expressions for this trial were (A) "at the upper right, the sphinx"; (B) "at the upper right, the man holding the red vase with a stripe"; (C) "at the upper right, the man holding the red vase with a stripe to the left of the sphinx"; (D) "at the upper right, to the left of the sphinx, the man holding the red vase with a stripe on it".
Methods
216
Participants. Thirty-two participants (median age 23, range = 19 -42 years old, 217 21 females) took part in the current study. One participant was dropped due to excessively 218 long reaction times. Due to the design of our study (where each participant's scanpath is 219 compared to that from the previous participant), the participant that followed this rejected 220 participant also had to be discarded from analysis as they would have been comparing their 221 typical length scanpaths to excessively long scanpaths.
222
Stimuli. Stimuli (images and search instructions) were taken from Clarke, Elsner,
223
and Rohde (2013b), in which participants were given a target and asked to provide a 224 description of how to find it (known in linguistics as a referring expression). We used as 225 a target one of the sixteen targets per image used in this previous study, as well as one of 226 the landmarks that had been spontaneously named by participants to help others to locate 227 the target. The following variations were constructed to give us four search instruction Procedure. Immediately following image onset, an audio recording of the search 238 instruction was played to participants over headphones, giving them the necessary informa-239 tion required to find the target. Participants pressed the space bar on the keyboard when 240 they had found the specified target. They were then required to use the mouse to click on 241 the target. This was done so that we had a record of search accuracy and participants were 242 not able to just press space without finding the target. Only eye movements from image 243 onset to the space bar response were used. 
252
Participants were asked to decide, by indicating the colour, which of the two scanpaths 253 was their own (hence the first participant did not carry out this part of the experiment).
254
Participants were not informed of the task in this part of the experiment until after they 255 had carried out the first part, thus excluding the possibility that participants could modify 256 their search behaviour to make it easier for them to remember their own eye movements. when participants pressed the space key to indicate that they had found the target, and 263 when they clicked on the target with the mouse to verify they had found it (6% of the 264 remaining data points). Unlike in reaction times, there was no clear cutoff to use to define 265 outliers (there is a long tail of click times with a maximum of 20 seconds) and so we ran 266 the analysis with and without this exclusion criterion. Results were similar in both cases.
267
Results
268
The difference between the conditions in terms of reaction time is summarised in A.
286
The results from this experiment suggest that participants are not very good at dis- recently looked may afford better performance.
300
Experiment 2: Objects in Scenes
301
As discussed in the introduction, another way in which participants could perform 302 above chance in the scanpath recognition task is by assuming the objects they remember 303 seeing in the scene are objects that they themselves fixated. As we will demonstrate, this 304 is a strategy that can elevate participants above chance, because it is in fact the case that 305 objects that are fixated in a scene are also more likely to be reported. Our second experiment 306 explicitly tested whether people used this recognition strategy by testing memory for objects 307 in the scene together with memory for which objects were fixated.
308
A previous study by Clarke, Coco, and Keller (2013a) asked participants to verbally 309 report objects from a natural scene immediately after presentation. They found the objects 310 that were named tended to also have been fixated but there were also many objects that were 311 named but not fixated, and objects that were fixated but not named. We took advantage to view a series of images. After each image was removed, they were asked to name objects 315 they remembered from the scene. On half of trials, they were then also asked if they had
316
"looked directly at" a specified query object or not. We expected participants would be able 317 to correctly confirm that they looked directly at an object when they had also named it.
318
We were particularly interested in whether participants could also correctly state (i) that 319 they did not fixate an object that they just named as having been in the scene, and (ii) 320 that they did fixate an object even though they did not name it. Being able to accurately 321 classify objects as having been fixated or not fixated irrespective of whether or not they 322 named them as having been in the scene would be a clear indication that people are able 323 to remember their fixations separately from the objects in the scene.
324
Methods
325
Participants. Thirty-two participants (median age 24.5, range = 20 -62 years 326 old, 22 females) volunteered for the current study. One participant was dropped due to a 327 recording error.
328
Stimuli. Stimuli were taken from the set of annotated images used by Clarke et al.
329
(2013a). In the original study, 24 participants viewed each image for three seconds while
330
wearing an Eyelink II eye tracker. After each scene was removed from display, participants 331 were asked to name objects they could remember from the scene (usually about five). Using 332 these data, we searched the set of 100 images for objects that matched the following criteria:
(a) "people, bench, geese, grass" (b) "laptop, mouse, chair, bed" Figure 4 . Two example trials. In the first image, the query object was the bottle (on the left by the bench) and the participant correctly answered that they had not fixated it. In the second image, the query object was the laptop and we can see that while the participant named it, they did not directly fixate it during the trial.
• Objects that were:
336
-Named by at least 70% of participants and fixated by at least 60%
337
-Named by at least 70% of participants and fixated by at most 33%
338
-Named by at most 33% of participants and fixated by at least 60%
339
-Named by at most 33% of participants and fixated by at most 33%
340
We created seven trials for each condition, giving a total of 28 critical trials. Note that • Accuracy: the proportion of all items successfully classified.
374
• Precision: the proportion items classified as A that are actually A.
375
• Recall: the proportion of items belonging to class A that are classified as A.
376
An object was considered to have been fixated by a participant if at least one of their 377 fixations fell within a polygon marking the outline of the object.
378
Results
379
Participants appeared to manage the naming task reasonably well, naming at least 380 four objects on nearly all trials. Two example trials with overlaid scanpaths and named 381 objects are shown in Figure 4 .
382
As explained above, image-object pairs were selected from an existing dataset to try as we have no control over which objects observers look at or name, we expected this to 386 vary from person to person. The trials were therefore re-categorised into the same four 387 conditions using the data based on our new participants' actual behaviour. The number of 388 trials in each condition is shown in Table 1 . With the exception of not fixated yet named 389 objects, we have an approximately even split of trials over condition.
390
We then examined accuracy in the fixation recollection task as a function of whether Figure 5 . (a) Accuracy statistics for the objects experiment. Accuracy to state whether an object has been fixated or not is modestly above chance. However, for objects that were not named, participants tend to report not having fixated it even when they had, resulting in a very low recall score. (b) Difference scores when comparing the observed accuracy to expected accuracy under a strategy of (i) responding that you fixated the object if and only if you named it ("named") and (ii) simply responding that you fixated every query object ("yes").
are more accurate at determining whether or not they fixated named objects on all three 393 measures (accuracy: median of 69% for named objects compared to 61% for unnamed 394 objects; precision: 78% compared to 67%; and recall: 88% compared to 24%). The largest 395 difference in between conditions is in recall, where the recall of fixated unnamed objects is 396 very low. This means that participants tended to incorrectly state that they did not fixate 397 an object when it was an object they had not named. When we compare these results to 398 some simplistic baseline strategies (Figure 5b ), we can see that human performance only 399 marginally outperforms some very simple response strategies: in particular, performance 400 is quite close to what would be expected if participants simply stated they fixated those 401 objects which they had named (median difference of 3.8%), with about 25% of participants 402 under-performing this strategy. Even more participants under-performed the strategy of 403 simply stating "yes" every time they were asked if they fixated a particular object.
404
We can further analyse these data by fitting a general linear mixed model to inves-405 tigate how the participant's response (whether they believe they have looked at the query 406 object or not) is influenced by (i) whether they have actually looked at the object and (ii) 407 whether they named the object. We fit a model with random intercepts for both participant 408 and image and the fixed effects are shown in Figure 6 . The results demonstrate that al-409 though actually fixating the object does influence the participant's response (the probability 410 of participant responding that they had fixated an object which they had neither fixated 411 or named was 14%, while for objects which were fixated but not named this rises to 33%), We can see that a named object is more likely to be reported as fixated than one that actually was fixated.
intervals presented in Figure 6 .
417
We also explore the extent to which total fixation duration has on the likelihood of 418 a participant reporting that they had fixated an object. We analyse the subset of the data 419 consisting of all trials in which the participant fixated the target object, and rerun the 420 general linear mixed model replacing the binary fixated factor with log total dwell time. simply respond that they looked at the objects that they named. This is in contrast to the were fully aware that they would need to report on their eye movements on every trial. replay shown wasn't theirs they pressed n. They were informed that the replay would be 496 their own eye movement 50% of the time.
497
The colour of the display screen changed colour depending on what phase of the trial 498 the participant was completing. This was implemented to help participants keep track of 499 the task. In the first phase, in which they were making, or preparing to make, an eye 500 movement, the screen was presented as pale orange. In the second phase, when participants 501 were watching, or preparing to watch, the gaze replay, the screen was blue. See Figure 7 502 for an example. Table 2 shows the distribution of saccade types by target position. Note, this collapses 512 over trials in which the target appeared at the inwards/outwards position, and those in 513 which it appeared in the central position and then moved.
Results
511
514
Participants were required to accurately identify if the gaze path presented at the end 515 of each trial was their own or someone else's. Accuracy to do so (in terms of the proportion 516 of trials with a correct response) was poor (mean participant accuracy = 52%, with only 517 five out of 28 participants managing to perform better than chance,with the most accurate 518 participant achieving a score of 70%. Three participants performed below chance.
519
Although overall accuracy was around 50%, classification differed between comparison 520 conditions. In particular, when participants were shown a direct saccade or a saccade with a 521 forward bias, they had a strong tendency to classify that saccade as their own. Conversely,
522
participants rarely classified saccades with backward corrections as their own. As can 523 be seen in Table 2 , participants did perform far fewer backward corrections than forward 524 corrections or direct saccades. This is clear from Figure 9a , which shows the tendency to
525
"claim" (i.e. identify as "mine") saccades on trials in which the participant was shown their 526 own saccade: when participants actually made a backward correction, they were far less 527 likely to claim the saccade than if they made a forward correction or direct saccade.
528
We can also break the results down into similar categories on trials in which the 529 participants were shown someone else's eye movements, shown in Figure 9b . Again, partic- Figure 9 . (a) Proportion of trials on which participants stated the saccade was their own for only those trials in which they were actually shown their own saccade. When the saccade was direct or had a forward correction, they were far more likely to state it was their own than when it contained a backward correction. (b) Proportion of trials on which participants stated the saccade was their own, for trials in which they were shown someone else's backward correction (first panel), direct saccade (second panel) or forward correction (third panel). The three bars within each panel separate the results based on which type of saccade the participant has themselves just executed; backward saccades were not very common, so this category should be interpreted with caution. In general, participants were just as likely to claim a saccade was their own when it matched the saccade they just executed as when it did not.
or forwards. Saccades that fell into a different category than the one that had just been 532 executed were as likely to be claimed as saccades that were in the same category. This con-
533
firms that participants have a bias to identify correct saccades as their own, and incorrect 534 saccades as having been generated by someone else. To the extent that participants do tend 535 to produce correct saccades, this bias boosts their overall accuracy in the discrimination 536 task, but it is clear they have little to no insight into their own saccade errors. even less aware of their own eye movements than previous research suggested. 545 In Experiment 1 we varied which target the person searched for, and, more sub-546 tly, altered the linguistic structure of the target description to include a salient landmark 547 description either before or after the target was specified. If participants can extract infor-mation about the goals or intentions driving the eye movements and compare it to their 549 own, they should be better able to discriminate their own eye movements when compared 
577
In Experiment 2 we established that individuals are able to use a memory of which 578 objects were present in the scene as a reasonable approximation of which objects were 579 fixated. Indeed, if participants simply report that they fixated any object they remember 580 having seen, the overall accuracy of these reports would be about 60-70%, suggesting this 581 is a good strategy for achieving above-chance accuracy even in the absence of any explicit 582 memory of fixations themselves. The results when we split recognition performance by 583 whether objects were named or not reveals that participants were relying on this strategy 584 almost entirely, with very low recall for objects that were not named -in other words, 585 participants thought they had fixated named objects even when they had not, and vice-586 versa. Indeed, having named an object was a better predictor of whether a given participant 587 stated they had fixated it than whether or not they actually fixated it. That said, after 588 accounting for the effect of naming, there was some variability in judgement of fixations that 589 could be accounted for by the fixations themselves. This could suggest that participants 590 had some memory for their own fixations independent of whether they remember the object 591 in the scene. On the other hand, we asked participants to name "around five" objects in the 592 scene, and it is quite plausible that some objects were encoded but then not subsequently named. This could be because participants could not easily put a verbal label on the object,
594
or simply prioritised it less than other objects in the scene. In any case, those few trials on 595 which participants report having fixated an object they did not name could represent trials 596 on which they encoded, but did not name, the object. Given how infrequent these instances 597 are, we can at the very least say that the dominant strategy for deciding whether an object 598 was fixated or not is to use one's own memory of whether or not it was in the scene at all.
599
Given that this strategy leads to above-chance accuracy in the fixation recall task, caution 600 should be exercised while interpreting results from experiments in which participants can 601 rely on memory for objects instead of fixations for accurate self-report (as they could in fixations, but rather a memory of what objects were or were not present in a scene.
604
In both Experiments 1 and 2 we find clear evidence that participants rely on alterna-605 tive strategies rather than fixational memory when reporting on their own eye movements.
606
This suggests we do not store a representation of fixations, at least not one we can easily 607 report. However, in both studies the task was difficult, and the real purpose of the study that made their eye movements more easily detected relative to the comparison eye move-628 ment than the others. A second explanation is that these participants were simply better 629 at noticing and using small systematic differences between eye movements to discriminate 630 one group from another.
631
In all the above experiments, the experience of the eye movement itself is different 632 from the medium we used to probe memory. In the first experiment, we showed scanpaths 633 as a series of lines connecting fixated points, which provides spatial and sequence informa-634 tion, but temporal information was removed. In the second experiment the memory probe 635 was even further abstracted from the actual experience of fixating the object because we 636 asked verbally about an object that was present in a scene which was no longer visible. 
728
Linear mixed-effect model of results from Experiment 1: We ran a general linear mixed-effect model (family=binomial) using the lm4 package for R. Specifically, we fit the model:
recog ∼ reID1 : reID2 + 0 + (1|participant) + (1|image)
We force the intercept to be 0 so that the beta coefficients are more easily interpretable: 
739
Appendix B
740
In Experiment 1 we found that participants did slightly better than chance when working out which one best fits the task they remember completely.
747
A potential confound however is that as the structure of the linguistic referring ex-748 pression varies, the difference between the two scan-paths increases. This raises the question 749 of whether participants' inability to recognise their own eye movements is due to the two Figure 10 . Examples of trials in which the observer's scan-path was paired with one from a second observer carrying out the same condition. In all examples given above, the observer failed to identify which scan-path was their own.
alternative choices being too similar to one another. We explore this possibility in Figure 10 751 which shows a selection of trials in which the two scan-paths are from observers following the 752 same referring expression, and the participant was unable to identify which scan-path was 753 their own. We can see that even though the two observers were given the same instructions,
754
there are often large differences in where they looked. 
